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1. Introduction 
Cash holdings and other liquid assets have always been important for the strategic decisions of 
shipping companies. For example, in May 2007, well before the outbreak of the global financial crisis, 
Navios Maritime Holdings Inc. purchased the Belgian maritime transport company Kleimar N.V. for 
$165.6 million in cash to get hold of Capesize and Panamax vessels used in the transportation of 
cargoes to China. More recently, Maersk Line acquired Hamburg Süd for €3.7 billion on a cash and 
debt-free basis in December 2016 to capture additional market share at times when poor conditions in 
the liner industry forced some rivals to underinvest. In May 2017, Scorpio Tankers and Navig8 
Product Tankers announced their merger, which will create the world’s largest product tanker player. 
In a first step, Scorpio Tankers will acquire four long range vessels from Navig8 for $42.2 million in 
cash, net of assumed debt. This cash, working as bridge financing, will form part of the balance sheet 
of the combined firm to signal financial strength.1 
The extant literature identified several motives for corporations to hold cash, which can explain 
the use of cash in the above examples from the shipping industry. For example, by using cash to make 
payments firms can save on transaction costs associated with having to liquidate assets. Miller and 
Orr (1966) document that brokerage costs induce firms to hold more liquid assets. Myers and Majluf 
(1984) argue that in the presence of asymmetric information, raising external financing is more costly 
than using internal funds, which makes it optimal for firms to hold a certain level of cash to meet their 
investment requirements. 
Another motive for firms to reserve cash is to hedge the risk of future cash shortfalls, which is 
known as the precautionary motive for cash holdings. Opler et al. (1999) show that firms tend to hold 
more liquid assets if the average cash flow volatility of their industry is higher. Mikkelson and Partch 
                                                 
1 For detailed empirical evidence on merger and acquisition (M&A) activities in the shipping industry, see 
Andreou, Louca, and Panayides (2012) and Alexandrou, Gounopoulos, and Thomas (2014). 
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(2003) document that firms that persistently hold large cash reserves do not underperform when 
compared with their peer firms. These studies suggest that firms use internally generated funds to 
hedge against future cash flow uncertainty and increase their cash holdings in response to increases in 
cash flow volatility. Supporting this hedging argument, Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004) 
find that financially constrained firms save more cash during bad business cycle periods than their 
unconstrained peers. Similarly, Han and Qiu (2007) directly examine the link between a firm’s cash 
holdings, cash flow uncertainty, and financial constraints and find that constrained firms have a 
stronger tendency to increase cash holdings when experiencing an upturn in cash flow volatility.2 
Motivated by the specific features that characterize companies operating in the shipping sector, 
in this study we extend the empirical evidence on corporate cash holdings by looking at the case of 
shipping companies. Shipping firms operate in an environment with a high degree of asymmetric 
information, face high cash flow and business (covariance) risks, and tend to work with high financial 
as well as operating leverage.3 It has been documented empirically that these characteristics are 
related to corporate cash holdings (Opler et al., 1999; Ferreira and Vilela, 2004; Ozkan and Ozkan, 
2004). 
In addition, raising external capital became more difficult for shipping companies following the 
2007-2009 financial mortgage crisis since banks’ borrowing facilities for asset-based lending have 
                                                 
2 We note two alternative views on why companies should hold cash. The first one is related to agency costs 
(Jensen, 1986). Several studies (Harford, 1999; Kalvecha and Lins, 2007; Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell, 2008; 
Tong, 2011) find that high excess cash holdings are manifestations of agency problems in firms where managers 
use cash holdings for their own benefit and to undertake value-decreasing acquisitions. Repatriation of cash for 
the purposes of optimizing tax liabilities may be another motive; this may be the case for international 
conglomerates that diversify their operations so as to arbitrage differences in tax regimes across various 
jurisdictions (Fole, Hartzell, Titman, and Twite, 2007; Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson, 2012). However, the 
same would not apply to shipping companies, which operate in an environment where tax liability is assessed 
based on a tonnage tax or are given special dispensations against paying tax. 
3 These special characteristics of the shipping industry are discussed in Albertijn, Bessler, and Drobetz (2011), 
Alizadeh and Nomikos (2011), Drobetz, Richter, and Wambach (2012), Drobetz et al. (2013), Nomikos et al. 
(2013), Kalouptsidi (2014), Papapostolou et al. (2014), Greenwood and Hanson (2015), and Drobetz, Menzel, 
and Schroeder (2016), among others. 
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been shrinking due to stricter bank regulation (Albertijn, Bessler, and Drobetz, 2011). The increased 
dependence of shipping firms on direct financing through the capital markets has created a 
challenging environment for shipping companies which will likely also impact their cash holdings. 
For example, on an aggregate basis, Bessler, Drobetz, and Grueninger (2011) observe a correlation 
between changes in cash holdings and changes in net equity. They show that firms tend to issue larger 
volumes of equity when adverse selection costs are temporarily low to build up or preserve cash 
reserves. 
Finally, another major characteristic of the shipping industry is its high degree of asset 
tangibility. On the one hand, due to the implementation of fair value accounting, vessel price risks 
have become more visible and integrated into a comprehensive corporate risk management process 
(Albertijn, Bessler, and Drobetz, 2011). On the other hand, modern commercial ships are highly 
industry-specific assets, and asset tangibility does not necessarily imply asset redeployment (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1992; Campello and Giambona, 2013).4 Drobetz, Haller, and Meier (2016) document that 
the high asset-specificity of vessels affects the ability of shipping firms to raise external capital, which 
in turn affects their investment activity even during benign liquidity conditions. Their empirical 
findings emphasize the importance of excess cash holdings, particularly in periods of crisis. While the 
post-crisis decline in investment activity was particularly severe in the shipping industry, excess cash 
holdings of some firms shipping offered financial flexibility and helped mitigate the negative effects.5 
                                                 
4 Computing the fire sale discount as the difference between the transacted price of an arrested vessel and the 
counterfactual price from a hedonic model, Franks, Sussman, and Vig (2015) estimate an average fire sale 
discount of 26% compared with ships of similar age and use. While half of this fire sale discount is driven by 
market illiquidity, they show that the other half is due to low maintenance of vessels and is concentrated in low 
valued vessels and corrupt ports. 
5 Drobetz et al. (2016) use a multi-equation model that incorporates all sources and uses of funds and examine 
what shipping firms do with an additional dollar of cash flow. While their findings also emphasize the strategic 
importance of cash in the shipping industry (e.g., an additional dollar of cash flow is added partly to cash 
holdings rather than paid out as dividends), they do not estimate the market value of cash on firms’ balance 
sheets. 
5 
Using propensity score matching, we construct a matched sample consisting of 144 globally 
listed shipping firms paired with manufacturing firms that are most similar. Shipping firms hoard 
more cash than their manufacturing matches in almost every year of our sample period, their average 
cash holdings being almost three times higher. Using standard target cash regressions, we find that 
these differences in the level of cash are not driven by firm- or country-level characteristics. Instead, 
an explanation is that shipping firms exhibit a higher market value of an additional dollar of cash than 
matched manufacturing firms. We find that shipping firms value an additional dollar of cash 
significantly higher than their peers in the manufacturing sector. We note that, while our valuation 
results for manufacturing firms are driven by financial constraints, all shipping firms, independent of 
their financial status, tend to have problems accessing the capital markets and thus have a higher 
marginal value of cash. Moreover, including Hofstede’s (2001) cultural dimensions into our baseline 
regression shows that shipping firms value cash higher when they originate from a country with lower 
individualism and higher uncertainty avoidance scores. Overall, it seems that shipping firms are more 
conservative on how they manage their cash holdings relative to their peer group. 
Finally, the higher marginal value of cash for shipping firms can also be attributed to the 
cyclicality of their growth opportunities. Successions of good times with easy access to capital 
markets and bad times with limited capital market access are a key characteristic of the shipping 
industry. Supporting evidence in Ahrends, Drobetz, and Puhan (2016), we find that shipping firms 
with less procyclical expansion opportunities have a higher marginal value of cash, especially in bad 
times of the business cycle when external capital supply becomes scarce. We show that low 
correlation shipping firms have a higher marginal value of cash because they use it for investment and 
effectively have higher investments out of their cash holdings. This benefit of cash holdings for 
shipping firms with less procyclical expansion opportunities creates a novel motive for precautionary 
savings. In particular, cash serves as a corporate hedging device in the shipping industry, e.g., 
6 
building up a ‘war chest’ to ensure the ability of ‘asset players’ to acquire vessels at fire sale prices 
during periods of industry weakness. The availability of cash provides a cushion that protects firms 
from underinvestment and allows increasing the market share during market-wide downturns 
(Ahrends, Drobetz, and Puhan, 2017). This is an important motive since asset play creates the 
opportunity for significant profits, which often compensate for the lackluster profit margins from 
operating in the freight market (Thanopoulou, 2010). 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the data set. Section 3 
shows our main empirical results for shipping firms’ cash holdings, the value of cash, and the impact 
of cash holdings on investment. Section 4 provides robustness tests, and section 5 concludes. 
2. Samples and descriptive statistics 
We use two different samples in our empirical analyses. The first sample consists of 155 listed 
shipping firms from 33 countries with 1,716 firm-year observations (shipping sample). The data for 
these shipping firms is taken from Compustat Global and Compustat North America annual files and 
includes the 1983-2014 period. The underlying universe of shipping ﬁrms was identiﬁed using 
Thomson Datastream business descriptions as well as publicly available information from websites 
and annual reports. The condition for firms to be included in the sample is that they own or operate 
commercial ships. Our sampling procedure thus ensures that the sample only comprises shipping 
ﬁrms in the sense of freight shipping companies.6 
To compare shipping firms in this sample to firms that are ‘similar’ but operate in a different 
industry (control group), we construct a matched sample using propensity score matching (PSM; 
                                                 
6 This selection implies that shipyards as well as passenger ships, drilling ships, and inland vessels are excluded 
since these ﬁrms are fundamentally different in the nature of their operations. In addition, the sample is 
restricted to firms with consolidated balance sheet data, and positive values for total book value and market 
value of assets. All variables are denominated in U.S. dollars. 
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Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). PSM aims to find the best match for every shipping firm among other 
(asset-heavy) manufacturing firms from Compustat Global and Compustat North America.7 
Appropriate matches for shipping firms that allow estimating the unobserved counterfactual and 
recovering the treatment effects of interest are manufacturing firms that are registered in the same 
country. In particular, for every shipping firm, the propensity score is calculated based on its mean 
values in firm size, sales growth, market-to-book, leverage, and fixed assets ratio.8 The best matched 
control for a shipping firm among the possible matches is the manufacturing firm with a propensity 
score closest to the score of the shipping firm. The PSM process is conducted without replacement, 
i.e., if a match for some shipping firm is found among manufacturing firms, this peer firm cannot be 
matched to another shipping firm. If no match can be found (i.e., if no manufacturing firm from the 
shipping firm’s country exists or if its propensity score differs by more than 20%), the shipping firm 
is excluded from the matched sample. The PSM process leads to a matched sample of 144 shipping 
firms and 144 manufacturing firms, with 1,641 and 1,173 firm-year observations, respectively.9 
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics of the variables used in our cash level regressions. All 
variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. Our main variable of interest, Cash, is defined 
as cash and short-term investments divided by total assets. SalesGr is the one-year change in sales. 
Div is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm paid dividends in a given year, and 0 
                                                 
7 Most studies on firms’ investment and financing decisions limit their samples to manufacturing ﬁrms, such as 
Fazzari, Hubard, and Petersen (1988), Gatchev, Pulvino, and Tarhan (2010), and Chen and Chen (2012). Both 
the manufacturing and the shipping sector are capital intensive, operate assets with long economic lives, and the 
assets can be easily collateralized. Manufacturing firms include all firms with the first-digit SIC code equal to 
two or three, but exclude firms with a two-digit SIC code of 39 (Miscellaneous Manufacturers). 
8 These matching variables are part of the set of traditional capital structure determinants (Rajan and Zingales, 
1995; Frank and Goyal, 2008). Firm size is defined as a firm’s total assets, sales growth is the percentage 
change in sales over the last year, market-to-book is market equity divided by book equity, leverage is the sum 
of long term debt and short term debt divided by total assets, and the fixed assets ratio is property, plant and 
equipment divided by total assets. In a robustness test, given the cyclicality of the shipping industry, we 
additionally match according to a firm’s cash flow volatility. All our results (not shown) remain similar. 
9 The difference in the number of firm-year observations between shipping and manufacturing firms in the 
matched sample is because shipping firms, on average, have a longer sample history than manufacturing firms. 
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otherwise. NWC is net working capital, calculated as current assets minus cash and current liabilities 
divided by total assets. CF is earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization divided by 
lagged total assets. Capex is capital expenditures divided by total assets. Size is the natural logarithm 
of total assets. Lev is total debt divided by total assets. Lev2 is leverage squared. Rec is receivables 
divided by total assets. Inv is inventories divided by total assets. PPE is property, plant and equipment 
divided by total assets. Profit is operating profit divided by total assets. 1/Z is the inverse of Altman’s 
(1968) Z-score. CashCC is the cash conversion cycle, calculated as the ratio of receivables to sales 
plus the ratio of inventories to the cost of sales minus the ratio of accounts payable to the cost of sales, 
multiplied by 360. MTB is market equity divided by book equity. CFVola is the volatility of operating 
cash flow, scaled by the absolute mean over the past four years and divided by 100. 
As expected, all values for matched shipping firms are similar to the values in the original 
shipping sample; 92% of the shipping firms in the shipping sample are also included in the matched 
sample. Therefore, we focus on the difference between matched shipping firms and matched 
manufacturing firms. Most importantly, for shipping firms in the matched sample Cash, on average, is 
12.6% (12.4% in the original shipping sample), while matched manufacturing firms only hold 7.3% in 
cash. This difference is also reflected in the median values of Cash, where matched shipping firms 
and matched manufacturing firms exhibit a value of 9.2% and 4.0%, respectively.10 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
To analyze the development of cash holdings of shipping firms and their manufacturing 
matches over time, Figure 1 illustrates the annual average cash holdings of matched shipping and 
                                                 
10 In addition, shipping firms boast higher profitability (Profit) than their manufacturing peers, which may imply 
that they are able to accumulate higher cash holdings over time. Leverage (Lev) is also higher for matched 
shipping firms than for matched manufacturing firms. We further note that shipping firms, on average, have 
lower Z-scores (or higher 1/Z-values) and therefore suffer from higher default risk than matched manufacturing 
firms, which may be another motive for shipping companies to hold more cash. 
9 
matched manufacturing firms. Corporate cash holdings have increased over time in both samples, a 
pattern that is consistent with earlier findings in Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009). The average level of 
cash holdings for shipping firms coincides with the shipping cycles, as it increased from the late 
1990’s to 2007 and then dropped again in 2008. It thus appears that shipping firms spent (or had to 
spend) their cash holdings in response to the sharp drop in freight rates. Most importantly, we observe 
that matched shipping firms hold, on average, 2.9 times more cash than matched manufacturing firms 
in each sample year except 1994. However, in the aftermath of the recent financial crisis, the drop in 
cash holdings was more pronounced for shipping firms than for manufacturing firms. 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
We note that Figure 1 also highlights the importance of matching for proper identification. In 
particular, when we compare our matched sample to the full Compustat Global sample of all 
manufacturing firms (326,221 firm-year observations), the average manufacturing firm holds more 
cash than both the average shipping firm and the average matched manufacturing firm in every 
sample year since 1985. However, the full sample of manufacturing firms includes firms that are 
markedly different to the shipping firms. In our matching process, we identify manufacturing firms 
that are most ‘similar’ to shipping firms (i.e., have the highest probability of receiving the treatment 
conditional on covariates) yet operate in a different industry. We can thus recover the treatment effect 
of interest and attribute any differences between shipping firms and manufacturing matches – as 
estimates of the unobserved counterfactuals – to the fact that they operate in different industries. 
3. Main empirical results 
In this section, we start by examining which factors determine the level of cash holdings in the 
shipping industry and whether these demand-side factors are different from other industries. We 
10 
proceed by estimating the marginal value of cash and test factors that drive the valuation differences 
between shipping and matched manufacturing firms. 
3.1. Cash holdings 
To analyze the level of cash holdings of shipping firms and their manufacturing matches, we 
base our methodology on prior studies (Kim, Mauer and Sherman, 1998; Opler et al., 1999; Kalcheva 
and Lins, 2007; Drobetz and Grueninger, 2007; Han and Qiu, 2007; Harford, Mansi and Maxwell, 
2008; Gao, Harford and Li, 2013; Chen et al., 2015b) and estimate the following baseline regression: 
(1) 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝐺𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑁𝑊𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼5𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼6𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡  
                   +𝛼7𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼8𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡
2 + 𝛼9𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼10𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼11𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼12𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖,𝑡  
                   +𝛼131/𝑍𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛼14𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝐶𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼15𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼16𝐶𝐹𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 
We include both year and firm fixed effects in all our estimations. Table 2 shows the results for 
the matched sample, divided into shipping firms and manufacturing firms. In columns (1) and (5), we 
follow Chen et al. (2015b) and regress Cash on the most basic firm characteristics. In columns (2) and 
(6), we extend the set of firm level control variables. The next columns, (3) and (7), further add 
country level controls. Country level control variables include GDP per capita, stocks traded, credit to 
private sector, law enforcement from World Development Indicators (WDI) provided by the World 
Bank, and the country corruption index from Trading Economics.11 Finally, in columns (4) and (8), 
we estimate a variation of the model in columns (2) and (6) by applying Arellano and Bond’s (1991) 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator.12 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
                                                 
11 For the sake of brevity, the country variable estimates are not reported in Table 2. 
12 We include three lags of Cash as instruments. AR(1) and AR(2) are the z-statistics for first-order and second-
order serial correlation, respectively. 
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A comparison of the results for shipping firms (columns 1-4) with those for matched 
manufacturing firms (columns 5-8) does not reveal notable differences in the importance (and the 
signs) of the various determinants of cash levels. Therefore, firms’ demand function for cash seems to 
be the same across industries. Most of the estimated coefficients are in line with prior studies, and 
thus we omit a detailed discussion. As an example, the positive impact CFVola exerts on Cash for 
both shipping firms and their manufacturing matches likely reflects the precautionary motive behind 
cash holdings (Opler et al., 1999; Han and Qiu, 2007). In contrast, the significantly positive impact of 
CF on Cash (Opler et al., 1999; Kalcheva and Lins, 2007; Drobetz and Grueninger, 2007; Han and 
Qiu, 2007; Harford, Mansi and Maxwell, 2008; Gao, Harford and Li, 2013) is consistent with the 
pecking order theory, which in short posits that internal funds represent the cheapest source of 
financing (Myers and Majluf, 1984). 
Overall, the estimates and their similarity for shipping firms and matched manufacturing firms 
indicate that the demand function for cash is the same across industries. We next run several 
robustness tests (not shown for the sake of brevity). First, we estimate our baseline regression model 
for the full matched sample and interact each explanatory variable with a dummy variable, Shippingi, 
which marks each firm as a shipping or manufacturing firm. Most interaction term estimates are 
statistically insignificant. Second, we add the shipping dummy to verify that shipping firms hold more 
cash than their manufacturing matches. As expected, the estimate of the shipping dummy is positive. 
Third, we estimate our baseline regressions for matched shipping firms and only include additional 
explanatory variables that are related to the shipping industry.13 The results remain unchanged. 
                                                 
13 We consider the following monthly control variables for the dry-bulk shipping market: the ratio of five-year 
old second-hand to newbuilding vessel prices (SH/NB); the total number of second-hand sale & purchase 
transactions; and the total number of new orders for newbuilding vessels that are placed each month. All 
shipping-related variables are taken from Clarksons’ Shipping Intelligence Network (SIN). 
12 
3.2. The value of cash holdings 
Our analyses using standard level of cash regressions indicate that the demand function for cash 
is the same in both industries, yet they cannot provide an answer to the question why shipping firms 
hold so much more cash than their manufacturing matches. Next, we examine whether shipping firms 
hold higher levels of cash because they have a higher valuation for an additional dollar of cash than 
manufacturing firms. Our methodology to estimate the value of cash holdings is based on Faulkender 
and Wang’s (2006) approach, who measure the effect one additional dollar of cash has on a firm’s 
excess stock return. The baseline regression is: 
(2) 𝑟𝑖,𝑡
𝐸 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1 × ∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼5𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 × ∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼6𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼7∆𝐸𝑖,𝑡 
           +𝛼8∆𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼9∆𝑅𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼10∆𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼11∆𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼12𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼13𝑁𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡, 
where 𝑟𝑖,𝑡
𝐸  is the excess stock return of firm i in year t, defined as a firm’s one-year stock market 
return minus the risk-free rate.14 ΔX is the change in variable X over the previous year. Cash is cash 
and short term investments. Lev is market leverage, calculated as total debt over the sum of total debt 
and the market value of equity. E is earnings, calculated as earnings before extraordinary items plus 
interest, deferred income taxes and investment tax credit. NA is net assets, defined as total assets 
minus cash and short term equivalents. RD is investments in research and development, I is interest 
expenses, D is common dividends, and NF is net financing, measured as total equity issuance minus 
repurchases plus debt issuance minus debt redemption. Since we scale a firm’s change in market 
equity by the lagged market equity of this firm to get the one-year stock market return, we also scale 
all independent variables (right-hand side), except Lev, B/M, and Size, by lagged market equity.15 
                                                 
14 We obtained data on the risk-free rate from Thomson Reuters Datastream and IMF International Finance 
Statistics. Faulkender and Wang (2006) used the 25 Fama-French benchmark returns instead of the risk-free 
rate. When replicating their study for Compustat North America merged with CRSP, we find that the results 
hold for both definitions of excess stock return. 
15 In a robustness test (not reported), we estimate the same valuation regression for matched shipping firms and 
only include additional shipping-related control variables. Our results do not change qualitatively. 
13 
This approach allows us to interpret the coefficients in the following way: the coefficient of the 
change in cash represents the change in a firm’s market value from a one dollar increase in cash. We 
expect the coefficient of ΔCash to be positive and close to 1 since one additional dollar of cash on the 
balance sheet should increase firm value by approximately one dollar. An estimated coefficient higher 
than one could be explained by the precautionary motive (cash provides additional financial 
flexibility), whereas a market value of one additional dollar of cash lower than 100 cents might be 
attributable to the agency motive (managers waste cash for value decreasing projects).16 
Our results for the matched sample are shown in table 3. Columns (1) and (2) focus on matched 
shipping firms. Column (1) shows the results of our basic regression without interaction terms. The 
coefficient of ΔCash is positive and significant at the 1% level as expected. On average, one 
additional dollar of cash is worth $0.89 for the shipping firms in our sample. Including the interaction 
terms in column (2) leads to a coefficient of ΔCash of 1.611 and, as expected, negative coefficients 
for both interaction terms (but only the coefficient on Cashi,t-1×ΔCashi,t is statistically significant). 
Taking the mean value of Casht-1 (0.390) and the mean value of Levt (0.530) in our sample, these 
estimates imply a market value of $1.20 of one additional dollar of cash in the mean shipping firm.17 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
Columns (3) and (4) show the results for the same regression specifications using the matched 
manufacturing sample. Both columns show significant coefficients of ΔCash. When we calculate the 
                                                 
16 The regression model includes two interaction terms. The first interaction term (Cashi,t-1×ΔCashi,t) captures 
the cash level that already exists in a firm, and the second interaction term (Levi,t×ΔCashi,t) incorporates the 
level of a firm’s leverage. Incorporating the existing cash and leverage levels is important for marginal utility 
considerations. For a firm that already holds a large amount of cash, one additional dollar of cash will be worth 
less compared to a firm that has not saved cash at all and could use the extra cash for investments (thus 
providing financial flexibility). Similarly, as firms have more leverage, less of the value created by the presence 
of an additional dollar of cash accrues to shareholders. Therefore, the more funding a firm already has in the 
form of cash or leverage, the lower will be the marginal value of cash. The coefficients of both interaction terms 
are expected to be negative. 
17 The marginal value of cash in column (2) is calculated as 1.611 + (–0.354×0.390) + (–0.511×0.530) = $1.20. 
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value of one additional dollar of cash for manufacturing firms, we find a market value of $0.74 
(column 3) and $0.99 (column 4).18 These estimates are notably lower than those for shipping firms. 
In column (5), we run our valuation regression for the full sample, including both shipping and 
matched manufacturing firms. For the average firm, one additional dollar of cash in the full sample is 
worth $1.18.19 Most importantly, column (6) adds an interaction term between ΔCashi,t and the 
shipping dummy (Shippingi). The coefficient of this interaction term is positive and statistically 
significant at the 10% level, further supporting our conjecture that shipping firms have a higher 
marginal value of cash than matched manufacturing firms. One dollar of extra cash is worth $1.27 for 
shipping firms, and only $0.90 for manufacturing firms.20 We thus conclude that shipping firms hold 
more cash than their manufacturing matches because the market value of one additional dollar of cash 
is higher, indicating that shipping firms have a higher need for cash than firms in other industries and 
that the views of managers, who choose the level of cash, match with those of their shareholders, who 
attribute a higher value to the marginal dollar of cash (Orlova, Rao, and Kang, 2017). 
3.3. The value of cash and financial constraints 
Next, we examine if there are groups of firms for which cash is more valuable than for others. 
For example, several studies find that financially constrained firms hold more cash than unconstrained 
firms because they face difficulties in obtaining external funding (Kim, Mauer and Sherman, 1998; 
Harford, 1999; Opler et al., 1999). Confirming this notion, Figure 2 shows that matched shipping and 
                                                 
18 The marginal value of cash in column (4) is calculated as 1.481 + (–0.279×0.201) + (–1.078×0.403) = $0.99. 
19 The marginal value of cash in column (5) is calculated as 1.573 + (–0.317×0.313) + (–0.620×0.479) = $1.18. 
20 The marginal value of cash in column (6) is 1.315 + (0.370×1) + (–0.344×0.313) + (–0.646×0.479) = $1.27 
for shipping firms and 1.315 + (0.370×0) + (–0.344×0.313) + (–0.646×0.479) = $0.90 for manufacturing firms. 
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manufacturing firms that are financially constrained hold more cash than unconstrained firms in most 
sample years.21 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
Building on these observations, several studies focus on the relationship between financial 
constraints and the value of cash and find that cash is worth more for financially constrained than 
unconstrained firms (Faulkender and Wang, 2006; Pinkowitz and Williamson, 2006; Denis and 
Sibilkov, 2010). We examine the impact of financial constraints on the value of cash in both shipping 
and manufacturing firms. Following Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004), Acharya, Almeida, 
and Campello (2007), Faulkender and Wang (2006), and Denis and Sibilkov (2010), we classify firms 
into constrained and unconstrained firms according to their payout ratio and firm size. A firm is 
financially constrained if its payout ratio is lower than 33% of the distribution, and unconstrained 
otherwise. As for firm size, a firm is classified as financially constrained if it belongs to smallest 33% 
of firms, and unconstrained if it belongs to the largest 33%. Given these classifications, we re-
estimate our value of cash regression for subsamples of financially constrained and unconstrained 
firms. 
The results are shown in Table 4. In columns (1)-(4) of Table 4, we include only manufacturing 
firms of the matched sample, divided into constrained and unconstrained firms. The estimated 
coefficient of ΔCash is only positive and statistically significant for constrained firms, but not for 
unconstrained firms. Accordingly, constrained manufacturing firms with their limited access to capital 
markets have a higher need for cash, and thus an additional dollar of cash is more valuable for them 
compared to unconstrained firms. This result corroborates Denis and Sibilkov’s (2010) finding that 
valuation effects related to ΔCash are strongly driven by financial constraints. 
                                                 
21 The data in Figure 2 starts only in 1990 because dividing the sample into four subgroups leads to insufficient 
observations for the 1983-1989 period. 
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[Insert Table 4 here] 
Columns (5)-(8) show results for the same models using the sample of shipping firms. Again, 
the coefficient of ΔCash is positive and significant for constrained shipping firms. More importantly, 
unlike for manufacturing firms, in the shipping sample even seemingly unconstrained firms seem to 
have problems to raise external funds, and thus an additional dollar of cash is highly valuable for 
them, as indicated by the significantly positive estimate for ΔCash. These results are also consistent 
with findings for asset-heavy industries, where industry-wide liquidity shocks, independent of a firm’s 
financial health, have a strong negative impact on firms’ investment and financing activities; such 
liquidity shocks may even trigger a ‘collateral channel’ effect, in which bankrupt firms impose 
negative externalities on non-bankrupt competitors through the impact of bankruptcy on collateral 
values (Shleifer and Vishny, 1992; Benmelech and Bergman, 2011; Campello and Giambona, 2013).22 
3.4. The value of cash and culture 
To capture the effect of culture on the value of cash, we add Hofstede’s (2001) cultural 
dimensions Individualism and Uncertainty Avoidance to our analyses. Countries with high values for 
Individualism represent a society where individuals are expected to take care of only themselves and 
their closest family. Countries with high Individualism scores also tend to be more optimistic and 
confident (Titman, Wei, and Xie, 2010; Chen et al., 2015a). In contrast, countries with low values for 
Individualism are societies with close family ties, where individuals are expected to look out for each 
other and are very loyal. With regard to cash holdings, one would expect that countries where 
individuals see themselves as a group that takes care of its members and are less confident (low 
Individualism) hold more cash opposed to cultures where managers are more confident and optimistic 
                                                 
22 Drobetz, Haller, and Meier (2017) show that the negative effects from declining collateral values during crisis 
times are more pronounced in the shipping industry than in manufacturing. Given the decline in collateral values 
during the recent financial crisis, shipping firms were able to increase long-term debt in order to avoid fire sale 
discounts in spite of the fact the credit markets were ‘frozen.’ At the same time, however, they also find that 
excess cash offers financial flexibility and mitigates those negative effects on investment (see Section 4 below). 
17 
regarding the firm’s financial condition (high Individualism). Similarly, Uncertainty Avoidance is 
defined by the degree to which a society feels comfortable with uncertainty. Countries that want to 
avoid uncertainty (high Uncertainty Avoidance) appear to have inflexible rules and principles and are 
rather risk averse, whereas countries with low Uncertainty Avoidance are more tolerant to divergent 
behavior and ideas. Therefore, countries that want to avoid uncertainty are expected to hold more 
cash. 
Supporting these arguments, previous studies find that Individualism has a negative impact on 
the level of cash holdings, and Uncertainty Avoidance a positive one (Chang and Noorbakhsh, 2009; 
Chen et al., 2015a). Applying this intuition to our value of cash regressions, we assume that managers 
and investors share the same view (Orlova, Rao, and Kang, 2017). If managers’ culture-based impacts 
on cash holdings are value maximizing from the investors’ perspective, we expect firms from 
countries with high Individualism scores to have a lower marginal value of cash than firms from 
countries with low Individualism scores. Similarly, we expect firms from high Uncertainty Avoidance 
countries to have a higher marginal value of cash than firms from low Uncertainty Avoidance 
countries. 
To include the effect of culture on the value of cash, we form subsamples based on 
Individualism and Uncertainty Avoidance. A firm is divided into the subsample of high (low) 
Individualism, if the Individualism score of its country of origin is within the top (bottom) 33% of the 
distribution. The same partition applies to Uncertainty Avoidance allocation. To test whether low 
Individualism firms and high Uncertainty Avoidance firms have a higher value of cash, and whether 
the effect is different for shipping firms and their manufacturing matches, we re-estimate our value of 
cash regression for subsamples and include the interaction term between ΔCash and the shipping 
dummy. 
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The results are shown in Table 5. The coefficient of ΔCash is positive and significant for three 
out of four subsamples; only for firms from countries with low Uncertainty Avoidance the estimate of 
ΔCash is insignificant. Focusing on the difference between shipping firms and manufacturing 
matches, the interaction term ΔCashi,t×Shippingi is significantly positive for low Individualism and 
high Uncertainty Avoidance firms, suggesting that shipping firms exhibit an even higher marginal 
value of cash than matched manufacturing firms when they originate from a low Individualism or a 
high Uncertainty Avoidance country.23 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
Overall, our findings indicate that the country of origin and the associated cultural background 
have an even higher impact on the marginal value of cash for shipping firms than for firms from other 
industries. A possible explanation for our results is that the shipping industry exhibits a concentrated 
ownership structure. Tsionas, Merikas, and Merika (2012) show that ownership in the shipping 
industry remains concentrated even in countries with strong minority shareholder protection. Using 
ownership data on 107 listed shipping firms, they find that, on average, the largest shareholder holds 
36% of the firm in the year of its IPO. Concentrated ownership implies a strong influence of the 
largest shareholder’s cultural background on financing decisions, and thus the views of managers and 
large shareholders are more closely aligned. For the two cultural traits examined (Individualism and 
Uncertainty Avoidance), the sign of the relationship between the cultural characteristic and the 
marginal value of cash, which reflects investors’ perspective, is the same as that found with respect to 
the level of cash holdings, which is chosen by firms’ managers. These cultural traits are shared both 
by managers and by investors and thus can be considered as value maximizing (Orlova, Rao, and 
Kang, 2017). 
                                                 
23 In particular, for shipping firms, the value of one additional dollar of cash is as high as $1.62 for the low 
Individualism subsample, and $1.11 for high Individualism firms. One additional dollar of cash is worth $1.45 
for high Uncertainty Avoidance firms, but only $0.81 for firms with low Uncertainty Avoidance. 
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3.5. The value of cash and cyclicality 
Another factor that can result in a higher marginal value of cash for shipping firms is the 
cyclical nature of the shipping industry. Successions of good times with easy access and bad times 
with limited access to capital markets are a key feature of the shipping industry. Firms with a low 
correlation between their growth opportunities and the aggregate business (or shipping) cycle tend to 
have less procyclical growth opportunities. These firms are more adversely affected by supply-side 
financial constraints during crisis periods, thus they should hold more cash and also value an 
additional dollar higher compared to firms with more procyclical expansion opportunities. From this 
perspective, cash serves as a hedging device. For example, for market participants with an ‘asset play’ 
strategy, it can ensure the ability to acquire vessels at ‘fire sale’ prices during periods of industry 
weakness. 
Following Arnold, Hackbarth, and Puhan (2016) and Ahrends, Drobetz, and Puhan (2016), we 
calculate the cyclicality of growth opportunities by looking at the correlation of a firm‘s growth 
opportunities with the business cycle (Corr); in our case, we consider the five-year rolling correlation 
of a firm’s Tobin‘s Q at time t and the ClarkSea index at time t-1. The idea is that the correlation 
between Tobin’s Q and the ClarkSea index captures how firm-individual investment opportunities 
(Tobin’s Q) move with the state of the shipping industry (ClarkSea index). A high correlation 
between a firm’s growth opportunities and the ClarkSea index indicates more procyclical expansion 
opportunities. In contrast, a low or negative correlation directs to a firm whose business model offers 
less procyclical (or even countercyclical) expansion opportunities. The mean (median) value of Corr 
in our sample is -0.10 (-0.09), and its distribution (not shown) spans over the entire possible range. 
To incorporate the novel Corr variable in our value of cash regression, we add an interaction 
term (ΔCashi,t×Corri,t) to measure the effect of the cyclicality of expansion opportunities on the 
marginal value of cash. We expect the coefficient of the interaction term to be negative. In good states 
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of the shipping industry, which to some extent is also an indicator for the overall economic situation, 
firms have easier access to external capital, since banks and other lenders tend to be more willing to 
provide funding. In contrast, in bad business cycle states, with supply-side frictions, external funding 
may be harder to acquire since capital is scarce, prohibitively costly, or not available at all. Therefore, 
the ability to invest in profitable projects without relying on external funding should be more 
important for less procyclical (low Corr) firms, and the value they attribute to an additional dollar of 
cash will be higher compared to high correlation firms. 
Table 6 shows the results. In column (1), the estimate of the interaction term (ΔCashi,t×Corri,t) 
is negative and statistically significant, which confirms that shipping firms with less procyclial 
expansion opportunities tend to have a higher marginal value of cash. As an example, to assess the 
economic impact, assume two firms, one with Corr = –1 and one with Corr = +1. The value of one 
extra dollar of cash for the low correlation firm is $1.58, but only $0.32 for the high correlation firm.24 
Columns (2) and (3) confirm these results. We divide the sample into high Corr firms (top 33% of the 
Corr distribution) and low Corr firms (bottom 33% of the Corr distribution) and find that the 
coefficient of ΔCash is only significant for low Corr firms, but not in the subsample of high Corr 
firms. 
Our hypothesis is that shipping firms find it harder to obtain external funding during bad times 
of the business cycle. Less procyclical shipping firms, which need external funds the most when 
capital supply is scarce, suffer even more from these frictions. Therefore, low Corr firms should have 
a higher value of cash in bad times compared to good times, and should also have a higher value of 
cash than high Corr firms in a bad business cycle state. We test these patterns in columns (4) and (5) 
by constructing two subsamples. In column (4), we include only bad state years (bottom 33% of the 
                                                 
24 The value of cash for Corr = –1 is calculated as 0.710 + (0.176×0.394) + (0.321×0.530) + (–0.630×–1) = 
$1.58. For Corr = +1, we have 0.710 + (0.176×0.394) + (0.321×0.530) + (–0.630×1) = $0.32. 
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distribution of the growth in the ClarkSea index). In column (5), only good state years are included 
(top 33% of the distribution of the growth in the ClarkSea index). The coefficient of the interaction 
term (ΔCashi,t×Corri,t) is only significant in the bad state subsample. As expected, an additional dollar 
of cash is worth more for less procyclical firms in bad times of the business cycle, when these firms 
tend to have relatively more growth opportunities. Conversely, the cyclicality of expansion 
opportunities does not impact the value of cash in good times, as firms can obtain funding from 
external sources. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
3.6. Cash holdings, cyclicality, and investment behavior 
Our results show that investors in firms with less procyclical growth opportunities place a 
higher value on cash holdings. Next, we analyze directly whether these precautionary savings can 
provide financial flexibility. We expect the investment spending of firms with less procyclical growth 
opportunities to be more sensitive to cash holdings compared to more procyclical firms. Our setup 
allows us to test whether low correlation firms have a higher marginal value of cash because they 
need it for investment and effectively have higher investments out of their cash holdings. 
We follow Kim, Mauer, and Sherman (1998) and Denis and Sibilkov (2010) to examine 
whether firms spend cash on investments using a three-stage least squares (3SLS) regression. To 
account for the endogeneity between cash and investment, we estimate the following system of 
equations: 
(3a) 𝑁𝑒𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾2𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾3𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾4𝑃𝑟𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝐺𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
(3b) 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜃0 + 𝜃1𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃2𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃3𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃4𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃5𝐶𝐹𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃6𝐶𝐶𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑖,𝑡 
                   +𝜃7𝑍𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃8𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃9𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝐺𝑟𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
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The dependent variable in equation (3a) is NetInv, which is calculated as capital expenditures 
and investment in research and development minus depreciation scaled by total assets at time t+1. In 
equation (3b) the dependent variable is Cash, cash and short-term investments divided by total assets. 
CF is EBITDA divided by sales. MTB is the ratio of market equity to book equity. PrSalesGr is the 
natural logarithm of sales growth over the previous two years. Size is the natural logarithm of total 
assets. Lev is total debt divided by total assets. CFVola is cash flow volatility, calculated as the 
median of the firm-level standard deviation of first differences in earnings before interest, taxes, 
depreciation and amortization over the prior five years. CCDur is the cash cycle duration at time t, 
calculated as the sum of average inventory age and average collection period less the average payment 
period. Z is Altman’s (1968) Z-score. RetSpread is the return on investment minus the risk-free rate. 
The return on investment is earnings before interest and taxes divided by total assets. Finally, 
AggSalesGr is the natural logarithm of (aggregate) mean sales growth. 
Firm fixed effects are included in all our three-stage least squares (3SLS) regressions. Applying 
a 3SLS-model for our estimations of Cash and NetInv is necessary to address the endogeneity 
between these variables. Cash and NetInv are both dependent on a firm’s investment opportunities: 
On the one hand, a firm with great investment opportunities has a higher need for cash holdings to 
fund these investments, and thus will hold more cash. On the other hand, a firm with good investment 
opportunities is likely to have higher cash flow from these investments, which can be used to pile up 
liquidity. Estimating the Cash and NetInv equations simultaneously helps us to identify the direct 
effect cash holdings have on investment. 
The results of our estimation for the shipping sample are presented in Table 7. Our main focus 
is on the results of equation (3a), which are reported in panel A of Table 7. In particular, we expect 
Cash to have a positive influence on NetInv. In column (1), we run the regression for the full shipping 
sample and find that the coefficient of Cash is positive and highly significant (at the 1% level). The 
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higher a firm’s cash holdings are, the more it spends on investment. In the next two columns, we split 
the sample into high Corr firms and low Corr firms to see whether Cash is more important for either 
of the two groups. Comparing the results of columns (2) and (3), we observe that Cash is only 
significant for low Corr firms, but not for high Corr firms. Firms with more procyclical expansion 
opportunities may not necessarily need cash holdings to fund their investment activities. In contrast, 
less procyclical firms, which neither have sufficient cash flows nor the possibility to raise cash from 
external sources exactly when they need it the most, are strongly dependent on liquidity savings for 
their investments activities. Therefore, an additional dollar of cash is worth more to those firms and, 
as expected, they also exhibit a higher sensitivity of investment to cash holdings. 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
In columns (4) and (5), we run the simultaneous equations model for two definitions of a bad 
economic state. In column (4), the bad state is defined in the same way as above: a year is classified 
as a bad state year if the growth in the ClarkSea index is within the bottom 33% of its distribution. 
Alternatively, in column (5), a year is defined as a bad state year if the level (rather than the growth 
rate) of the ClarkSea index is within the bottom 33% of its distribution. In both cases, the coefficient 
of Cash is positive, whereas it is only statistically significant in column (5). 
Finally, we keep our initial bad state definition in columns (6) and (7) and divide the subsample 
further into high Corr and low Corr firms (conditional on being in a bad state). This specification 
allows us to test whether less procyclical firms need more cash for their investment activities during 
bad times. Confirming this conjecture, the coefficient of Cash in column (7) is positive and 
statistically significant, i.e., for low Corr (less procyclical) firms cash is more important for 
investments during bad states. In contrast, conditional on being in a bad state, cash is less valuable for 
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high Corr (more procyclical) firms, as indicated by the coefficient of Cash in column (6), which is 
insignificant. 
4. Robustness tests 
As already explained, the importance of cash holdings for investment is expected to be highest 
in times when the supply of external capital is scarce and cash is the only available source of funding. 
Recognizing that the capital markets ‘froze’ during the recent financial crisis (Campello, Graham, and 
Harvey, 2010; Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010), we focus on the 2007-2009 liquidity crisis and exploit 
it as a natural experiment. We reduce our matched sample to a subsample that only includes the 
shorter period 2004-2010, and we classify the period 2008-2010 as the crisis period. While several 
studies concur that the recent financial crisis started in 2007 (Almeida et al., 2012; Kahle and Stulz, 
2013), the shipping industry was not affected until the last quarter of 2008, when the BDI dropped by 
more than 90%. A consensus is that the crisis only lasted until 2009, but the shipping sector was 
affected until at least 2010 (Albertijn, Bessler, and Drobetz, 2011). Therefore, we consider the period 
from 2008 to 2010 as the crisis period, and the period 2004 to 2007 as the non-crisis period.25. 
Based on Duchin et al.’s (2010) methodology, we run a difference-in-differences model for our 
matched sample consisting of both shipping and manufacturing firms: 
(4) 𝑁𝑒𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝜗0 + 𝜗1𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝜗2𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡 × 𝑆ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖 + 𝜗3𝑆ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖+𝜗4𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖,𝑡  
                           +𝜗5𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖,𝑡 × 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝜗6𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖,𝑡 × 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡 × 𝑆ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖 
                           +𝜗7𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖,𝑡 × 𝑆ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖 + 𝜗8𝑄𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜗9𝑂𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 , 
where NetInv, Cash, and Shipping are defined as above. Crisis is an indicator variable that takes 
the value of 1 during crisis years (2008-2010), and 0 during non-crisis years (2004-2007). Q is 
                                                 
25 In results not shown, we find that changing the crisis period to the years 2007-2009 for manufacturing firms 
does not qualitatively change our findings. 
25 
Tobin’s Q, and OCF is operating cash flow, defined as earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, 
and amortization divided by total assets.26 
In our analyses above, shipping firms have been shown to have a greater marginal value of cash 
than their manufacturing matches, and we expect that this effect was strongest during the recent crisis. 
In crisis times, shipping firms may have a significantly higher need for cash than manufacturing firms 
in order not to be forced to cut investments. Accordingly, the coefficient of the triple interaction term 
(Cashi,t×Crisist×Shippingi) is expected to be positive. 
The results are shown in Table 8. In column (1), we regress the crisis dummy, Crisis, on net 
investment, NetInv. As expected, the estimate is negative and statistically significant, indicating that 
firms generally invested less during the recent crisis. Adding the shipping dummy in column (2) 
indicates that shipping firms boasted higher investments than matched manufacturing firms (positive 
coefficient of Shipping), and were subsequently more affected in their investment behavior by the 
crisis (negative coefficient of interaction term Crisist×Shippingi). The high volume of newbuilding 
orders during the pre-crisis period, combined with time-to-build delays (and other adjustment costs) 
and partial negligence of the endogenous investment responses of competitors, supports the view that 
shipping firms overinvested in good times (which were associated with rising freight rates and vessel 
prices). As a result, the low demand for tonnage during the subsequent crisis has hit shipping firms 
harder than comparable manufacturing firms (Kalouptsidi, 2014; Greenwood and Hanson, 2015). 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
In column (3), we add Cash to our regression model. As expected, we find that Cash has a 
positive impact on investment; holding cash is one way to fund investments. When we interact Cash 
                                                 
26 The results are qualitatively similar when we use pre-crisis cash holdings as in Duchin et al. (2010) instead of 
the contemporaneous Casht variable. 
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with the Crisis dummy in column (4), we find no significant relation for the matched sample. 
Therefore, for the average firm in our sample, cash is not more important for investment during crisis 
times. This finding is surprising, as one expects that investments are more sensitive to cash holdings 
during times when the supply of capital is scarce. In order to differentiate between shipping firms and 
matched manufacturing firms, in column (5) we include the shipping dummy to construct a triple 
interaction term (Cashi,t×Crisist×Shippingi). The coefficient of this triple interaction term is positive, 
indicating that cash is more important for investment during a crisis, but only for our sample of 
shipping firms. 
As another robustness test, we run the value of cash regression again on the full shipping 
sample, now forming subsamples of high and low correlation firms coupled with high levels of 
investment. A firm is classified as high investment when its NetInv is within the top 33% of the 
distribution. High and low correlation firms are classified as described above. The results are 
presented in Table 9. The first two columns replicate our basic value of cash regression. We again 
find a positive and significant coefficient of ΔCash in both columns, and a negative estimate of the 
interaction term (ΔCashi,t×Corri,t), confirming that less procyclical firms have a higher marginal value 
of cash. 
Next, dividing the sample into high Corr (column 3) and low Corr (column 5) firms, we find 
that the coefficient of ΔCash is higher for low Corr firms, which again confirms that low correlation 
firms have a higher marginal value of cash. The value of one additional dollar of cash should be even 
higher for firms with high investment activities. We form two additional subsamples, one consisting 
of high Corr firms with high investments (column 4), and one consisting of low Corr firms with high 
investments (column 6). Both high and low Corr firms with high investment activities have high 
marginal values of cash. However, we note that the increase in the marginal value of cash is higher for 
the high investment-low Corr firms. A caveat is that sample size is small in some of the subsamples. 
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[Insert Table 9 here] 
5. Conclusions 
This study analyses the level and value of cash holdings for shipping companies. We construct 
a sample consisting of 144 globally listed shipping companies paired with matched manufacturing 
companies that are most ‘similar.’ Overall, shipping companies seem to manage their cash positions 
more conservatively and hold up to three times more cash than their manufacturing matches in almost 
every year of our sample period. Given that the shipping industry is generally considered as risky due 
to its cyclicality, its high information asymmetry, and its high financial as well as operating leverage, 
the high level of cash holdings is consistent with a precautionary motive. 
We document that shipping companies hold more cash because they value an additional dollar 
of cash higher than their manufacturing peers, irrespective of whether they are financially constrained 
or not. It seems that even seemingly unconstrained shipping companies have problems raising 
external funds, and thus an additional dollar of cash is highly valuable for them. The country of origin 
and the associated cultural background also have an impact on their marginal value of cash. In 
particular, shipping companies exhibit a higher marginal value of cash when they originate from a 
country with lower individualism and higher uncertainty avoidance scores. This finding can be 
explained by the more concentrated ownership evidenced in shipping, which implies a strong 
influence of the largest shareholder’s cultural traits on corporate decision making. 
The higher marginal value of cash for shipping firms is also attributable to the cyclicality of 
expansion opportunities. Successions of good times with easy access, and bad times with limited 
access to capital markets are a key feature of the shipping industry. Shipping firms with less 
procyclical expansion opportunities are expected to require more cash for their investment activities 
than more procyclical firms. Supporting this conjecture, we find that an additional dollar of cash is 
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worth more for less procyclical firms in bad times of the business cycle, when these firms tend to have 
relatively more growth opportunities. Conversely, the cyclicality of expansion opportunities does not 
have an impact on the value of cash in good times, as firms can easily obtain funding from external 
sources. Cash holdings serves as a hedging device in the shipping industry, e.g., by ensuring the 
ability of ‘asset players’ to acquire vessels at fire sale prices and increase market share during periods 
of industry weakness. This creates a novel motive for precautionary savings, since asset play creates 
the opportunity for significant profits, which often compensate for the lackluster profit margins from 
operating in the freight market. 
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Tables 
Table 1 
Descriptive statistics 
This table reports descriptive statistics of all manufacturing firms, matched manufacturing firms, all shipping firms, and matched shipping 
firms from 1983 to 2014. Data are from the Compustat Global and Compustat North America annual files. All variables are reported in 
USD. The table includes all variables of the level of cash regression. Xt is the level of a variable at time t. Cash is cash and short-term 
investments divided by total assets. SalesGr is the one-year change in sales. Div is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm 
paid dividends at time t, and 0 otherwise. NWC is net working capital, calculated as current assets minus cash and current liabilities divided 
by total assets. CF is EBITDA at time t divided by total assets at time t-1. Capex is capital expenditures divided by total assets. Size is the 
natural logarithm of total assets. Lev is total debt divided by total assets. Lev2 is leverage squared. Rec is receivables divided by total assets. 
Inv is inventories divided by total assets. PPE is property, plant and equipment divided by total assets. Profit is operating profit divided by 
total assets. 1/Z is the inverse of Altman’s (1968) Z-score. CashCC is the cash conversion cycle, calculated as the ratio of receivables to 
sales plus the ratio of inventories to the cost of sales minus the ratio of accounts payable to the cost of sales, multiplied by 360. MTB is 
market equity divided by book equity. CFVola is the volatility of cash flow, calculated as the standard deviation of operating cash flow 
scaled by the absolute mean over the past four years divided by 100. 
  All manufacturing  Matched manufacturing  All shipping  Matched shipping 
  Mean Median S.D  Mean Median S.D  Mean Median S.D  Mean Median S.D 
Casht  0.162 0.101 0.177  0.073 0.040 0.094  0.124 0.088 0.115  0.126 0.092 0.116 
SalesGrt  0.120 0.072 0.380  0.111 0.060 0.369  0.126 0.065 0.434  0.115 0.062 0.412 
Divt  0.441 0.000 0.497  0.452 0.000 0.498  0.522 1.000 0.500  0.514 1.000 0.500 
NWCt  0.072 0.078 0.199  -0.042 -0.015 0.174  -0.082 -0.051 0.155  -0.083 -0.051 0.150 
CFt  0.078 0.099 0.195  0.101 0.097 0.111  0.116 0.102 0.115  0.116 0.102 0.112 
Capext  0.052 0.037 0.051  0.079 0.055 0.079  0.122 0.087 0.174  0.119 0.086 0.171 
Sizet  5.064 4.986 1.935  5.506 5.369 1.767  6.468 6.514 1.452  6.471 6.507 1.460 
Levt  0.228 0.199 0.198  0.306 0.287 0.191  0.431 0.427 0.215  0.430 0.426 0.211 
Lev2t  0.091 0.040 0.143  0.130 0.082 0.149  0.232 0.182 0.246  0.230 0.181 0.219 
Rect  0.192 0.180 0.112  0.120 0.108 0.072  0.059 0.044 0.058  0.060 0.046 0.058 
Invt  0.166 0.146 0.113  0.092 0.081 0.066  0.011 0.007 0.016  0.012 0.007 0.017 
PPEt  0.299 0.278 0.185  0.614 0.638 0.171  0.683 0.718 0.192  0.674 0.711 0.191 
Profitt  0.022 0.055 0.186  0.036 0.044 0.136  0.049 0.047 0.085  0.049 0.047 0.083 
1/Zt  0.437 0.367 0.739  0.659 0.535 7.160  1.420 0.719 15.710  1.044 0.707 3.862 
CashCCt  126.81 101.67 136.87  91.95 72.25 135.73  16.87 15.85 95.86  17.59 16.09 95.64 
MTBt  2.030 1.345 2.618  1.750 0.985 9.982  1.162 0.897 6.039  1.148 0.897 4.179 
CFVolat  0.002 0.002 0.030  0.004 0.002 0.068  0.004 0.004 0.067  0.004 0.003 0.046 
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Table 2 
Level of cash regressions 
This table shows the results of the level of cash regressions of the matched sample divided into shipping firms and manufacturing firms with 
Cash as the dependent variable and firm characteristics as independent variables. Xt is the level of a variable at time t. Cash is cash and 
short-term investments divided by total assets. SalesGr is the one-year change in sales. Div is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 
if the firm paid dividends at time t, and 0 otherwise. NWC is net working capital, calculated as current assets minus cash and current 
liabilities divided by total assets. CF is EBITDA at time t divided by total assets at time t-1. Capex is capital expenditures divided by total 
assets. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Lev is total debt divided by total assets. Lev2 is leverage squared. Rec is receivables 
divided by total assets. Inv is inventories divided by total assets. PPE is property, plant and equipment divided by total assets. Profit is 
operating profit divided by total assets. 1/Z is the inverse of Altman’s (1968) Z-score. CashCC is the cash conversion cycle, calculated as the 
ratio of receivables to sales plus the ratio of inventories to the cost of sales minus the ratio of accounts payable, multiplied by 360. MTB is 
market equity divided by book equity. CFVola is the volatility of cash flow, calculated as the standard deviation of operating cash flow 
scaled by the absolute mean over the past four years divided by 100. Firm and year fixed effects (FE) are included. Standard errors are 
heteroscedasticity-consistent and clustered at the firm level. t-statistics are shown in parentheses. Regressions (3) and (7) include country 
controls (unreported for brevity). *, **, and *** correspond to statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 Matched shipping firms  Matched manufacturing firms 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)   (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  
SalesGrt -0.012 ** -0.007  -0.009  -0.008   0.000 -0.015 ** 0.004 -0.035 ** 
 (-2.036)  (-1.116)  (-1.051)  (-0.485)   (0.015) (-2.410) (0.601) (-2.130)  
Divt 0.014 ** 0.015 *** 0.018 *** 0.035 *  0.000 0.001 0.003 0.007  
 (2.430)  (2.926)  (2.794)  (1.811)   (0.075) (0.145) (0.516) (0.440)  
NWCt -0.003  -0.026  -0.021  -0.048   -0.035 ** -0.012  0.027 0.081  
 (-0.181)  (-1.473)  (-0.947)  (-0.673)   (-2.183)  (-0.685)  (1.313) (1.147)  
CFt 0.059 ** 0.117 *** 0.216 *** 0.141 **  0.115 *** 0.146 ** 0.136 ** 0.084  
 (2.228)  (2.929)  (4.579)  (2.061)   (3.754)  (2.557)  (2.214)  (0.633)  
Capext 0.024 * -0.020  -0.029  -0.089   -0.032  -0.065 * -0.001  -0.045  
 (1.839)  (-0.974)  (-1.141)  (-1.187)   (-1.074)  (-1.921)  (-0.022)  (-0.598)  
Sizet -0.022 *** -0.003  0.006  -0.043 ***  -0.015 *** -0.005  -0.006  -0.018  
 (-4.686)  (-0.748)  (0.604)  (-2.852)   (-3.302)  (-1.053)  (-0.855)  (-0.800)  
Levt -0.142 *** 0.002  -0.077 * -0.465 ***  -0.116 *** -0.267 *** -0.335 *** -0.075  
 (-8.234)  (0.050)  (-1.656)  (-2.984)   (-6.826)  (-6.280)  (-5.436)  (-0.527)  
Lev2t    -0.058 ** 0.022  0.404 ***   0.196 *** 0.318 *** 0.035  
    (-2.006)  (0.499)  (2.708)    (4.314)  (3.979)  (0.215)  
Rect    -0.416 *** -0.325 *** -1.714 ***   -0.241 *** -0.462 *** -0.476 ** 
    (-5.918)  (-3.092)  (-4.686)    (-4.585)  (-7.597)  (-2.450)  
Invt    -0.097  -0.932 *** -1.552    -0.482 *** -0.652 *** -0.692 *** 
    (-0.592)  (-2.754)  (-1.440)    (-6.876)  (-8.362)  (-3.251)  
PPEt    -0.438 *** -0.426 *** -0.690 ***   -0.315 *** -0.411 *** -0.262 *** 
    (-24.050)  (-17.089)  (-8.654)    (-12.909)  (-14.842)  (-2.729)  
Profitt    0.020  -0.186 *** -0.100    -0.098  -0.146 ** 0.130  
    (0.404)  (-2.698)  (-1.032)    (-1.630)  (-2.282)  (0.843)  
1/Zt    -0.000  -0.000  -0.002    0.001  0.001  -0.008  
    (-0.124)  (-0.183)  (-1.329)    (0.973)  (1.200)  (-1.365)  
CashCCt    -0.000 *** 0.000  0.000    -0.000 *** 0.000  -0.000  
    (-3.601)  (0.869)  (0.822)    (-2.705)  (0.016)  (-0.183)  
MTBt    0.001  -0.002  0.003    0.000  0.002  -0.001  
    (0.467)  (-0.702)  (0.450)    (0.556)  (1.004)  (-1.004)  
CFVolat    0.107 *** 0.083  0.339 **   0.107 *** 0.077 *** 0.163 *** 
    (2.793)  (1.514)  (2.440)    (4.299)  (3.379)  (2.739)  
Casht-1    -0.026      -0.014  
     (-0.529)      (-0.220)  
Casht-2     -0.001      -0.086 * 
     (-0.032)      (-1.796)  
Casht-3     0.088      -0.405 *** 
     (1.304)      (-4.377)  
Constant 0.247 *** 0.390 *** 0.995 ***   0.292 *** 0.393 *** -0.006  
 (5.045)  (8.893)  (5.714)    (4.005)  (4.693)  (-0.043)  
FE: year, firm yes yes yes no  yes yes yes no 
AR(1)       -2.89      -2.91  
AR(2)       -2.14      0.01  
Observations 1,641  1,166  593  1,003   1,173  764  393  618  
Adjusted R2 0.544  0.753  0.822  -   0.628  0.759  0.823  -  
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Table 3 
Value of cash regressions 
This table shows the results of the value of cash regressions of matched shipping firms, matched manufacturing firms, and the full matched 
sample with the excess stock as the dependent variable and firm characteristics as independent variables. Xt is the level of a variable at time 
t. ΔXt is the one-year change in variable X. Cash is cash and short-term investments divided by lagged market equity. Shipping is an 
indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm operates in the shipping industry, and 0 otherwise. Lev is market leverage. E is 
earnings before extraordinary items plus interest, deferred income taxes and investment tax credit divided by lagged market equity. NA is 
total assets minus cash and short term investments divided by lagged market equity. RD is investments in research and development divided 
by lagged market equity. I is interest expenses divided by lagged market equity. D is common dividends paid divided by lagged market 
equity. NF is net financing, calculated as total equity issuance minus repurchases plus debt issuance minus redemption. B/M is book equity 
divided by market equity. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity-consistent and clustered at the 
firm level. t-statistics are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** correspond to statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. 
 Matched shipping firms  Matched manufacturing firms  Full matched sample 
 (1)  (2)   (3)  (4)   (5)  (6)  
ΔCasht 0.887 *** 1.611 ***  0.744 *** 1.481 ***  1.573 *** 1.315 *** 
 (5.401)  (4.388)   (3.908)  (3.534)   (5.660)  (4.631)  
ΔCasht × Shipping           0.370 * 
           (1.819)  
Casht-1 × ΔCasht    -0.354 **   -0.279   -0.317 ** -0.344 ** 
    (-2.274)    (-0.635)   (-2.168)  (-2.321)  
ΔCasht × Levt    -0.511    -1.078 *  -0.620  -0.646  
    (-1.034)    (-1.701)   (-1.582)  (-1.601)  
Levt -1.129 *** -1.078 ***  -0.556 *** -0.548 ***  -0.761 *** -0.758 *** 
 (-8.328)  (-8.669)   (-5.730)  (-5.764)   (-10.120)  (-9.835)  
ΔEt 0.278 ** 0.229 **  0.251 ** 0.248 **  0.246 *** 0.243 *** 
 (2.155)  (2.130)   (2.050)  (2.061)   (2.746)  (2.735)  
ΔNAt 0.101 ** 0.108 **  0.258 *** 0.260 ***  0.163 *** 0.164 *** 
 (1.971)  (2.289)   (4.097)  (4.116)   (4.102)  (4.109)  
ΔRDt -35.147  -77.433   -2.463  -2.197   -2.087  -1.859  
 (-1.160)  (-1.026)   (-0.928)  (-0.859)   (-0.891)  (-0.824)  
ΔIt -0.785 ** -0.667 *  -1.281 * -1.252 *  -0.734 ** -0.739 ** 
 (-2.095)  (-1.735)   (-1.817)  (-1.736)   (-2.031)  (-2.045)  
ΔDt 0.898 * 0.744   0.537  0.374   0.640  0.681 * 
 (1.888)  (1.596)   (0.770)  (0.509)   (1.516)  (1.717)  
Casht-1 0.709 *** 0.696 ***  0.513 *** 0.445 ***  0.566 *** 0.562 *** 
 (5.188)  (6.023)   (4.284)  (3.892)   (6.218)  (6.051)  
NFt 0.009  -0.004   -0.044  -0.050   -0.025  -0.027  
 (0.146)  (-0.066)   (-0.501)  (-0.623)   (-0.536)  (-0.582)  
B/Mt -0.010  -0.011   -0.007  -0.008   -0.010 * -0.010 * 
 (-1.488)  (-1.521)   (-0.733)  (-0.772)   (-1.864)  (-1.861)  
Sizet -0.019  -0.015   -0.007  -0.008   -0.009  -0.009  
 (-0.819)  (-0.683)   (-0.605)  (-0.695)   (-0.926)  (-0.852)  
Shipping        -0.004  
        (-0.090)  
Constant 0.561 *** 0.497 ***  0.258 *** 0.264 ***  0.339 *** 0.342 *** 
 (2.825)  (2.743)   (3.271)  (3.396)   (4.193)  (4.185)  
Observations 1,299   1,299    881  881   2,180  2,180   
Adjusted R2 0.272  0.291   0.190  0.197   0.255  0.256  
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Table 4 
Value of cash regressions and financial constraints 
This table shows the results of the value of cash regressions of the matched sample with the excess stock as the dependent variable and firm 
characteristics as independent variables. Xt is the level of a variable at time t. ΔXt is the one-year change in variable X. Cash is cash and 
short-term investments divided by lagged market equity. Lev is market leverage. E is earnings before extraordinary items plus interest, 
deferred income taxes and investment tax credit divided by lagged market equity. NA is total assets minus cash and short term investments 
divided by lagged market equity. RD is investments in research and development divided by lagged market equity. I is interest expenses 
divided by lagged market equity. D is common dividends paid divided by lagged market equity. NF is net financing, calculated as total 
equity issuance minus repurchases plus debt issuance minus redemption. B/M is book equity divided by market equity. Size is the natural 
logarithm of total assets. Companies are classified as financially constrained or unconstrained based on the payout ratio or firm size. 
Standard errors are heteroscedasticity-consistent and clustered at the firm level. t-statistics are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** 
correspond to statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 Matched manufacturing firms  Matched shipping firms 
 Payout ratio Firm size  Payout ratio Firm size 
 
(1) 
Constrained 
(2) 
Unconstr. 
(3) 
Constrained 
(4) 
Unconstr. 
 
(5) 
Constrained 
(6) 
Unconstr. 
(7) 
Constrained 
(8) 
Unconstr. 
ΔCasht 1.798 *** 0.450  1.879 *** 2.001  1.758 *** 1.326 *** 2.036 *** 1.862 *** 
 (3.843)  (0.654)  (4.629)  (1.148)   (3.405)  (4.007)  (3.393)  (3.531)  
Casht-1 × ΔCasht -0.560  0.231  -0.810 ** 0.507  -0.530 *** 0.207  -0.217  -0.608 *** 
 (-1.193)  (0.308)  (-2.515)  (1.454)   (-3.143)  (1.089)  (-1.381)  (-4.027)  
ΔCasht × Levt -0.933  -0.179  -1.239 ** -2.024   -0.379  -0.806 * -1.534 ** -0.518  
 (-1.260)  (-0.130)  (-1.998)  (-0.834)   (-0.554)  (-1.670)  (-2.002)  (-0.601)  
Levt -0.632 *** -0.302 * -0.330 *** -1.087 ***  -1.053 *** -0.533 *** -0.857 *** -1.234 *** 
 (-6.106)  (-1.843)  (-2.635)  (-2.963)   (-6.801)  (-4.328)  (-3.523)  (-7.874)  
ΔEt 0.129  0.836 * 0.165  0.335  0.136  0.575 *** 0.023  0.351 ** 
 (1.274)  (1.716)  (0.893)  (1.406)   (1.225)  (3.745)  (0.279)  (2.574)  
ΔNAt 0.228 *** 0.509 *** 0.194 *** 0.697 ***  0.061  0.427 *** 0.095  0.162 ** 
 (3.082)  (3.657)  (3.046)  (4.931)   (1.237)  (5.729)  (1.139)  (2.454)  
ΔRDt -1.657  -6.634  2.455  -25.155 ***  -283.006 *** 17.707 *** -758.074  -100.502  
 (-0.779)  (-0.956)  (1.056)  (-4.042)   (-4.512)  (2.745)  (-0.907)  (-1.063)  
ΔIt -1.254 * -1.383  -1.624  -1.657  -0.463  -3.124 *** -0.762 ** -0.190  
 (-1.924)  (-0.452)  (-1.487)  (-1.525)   (-1.136)  (-3.002)  (-2.067)  (-0.190)  
ΔDt -1.555  0.663  1.358  1.650  -0.249  0.824 * 0.249  0.768  
 (-0.873)  (0.968)  (0.697)  (0.764)   (-0.426)  (1.647)  (0.373)  (1.076)  
Casht-1 0.452 *** 0.414 *** 0.479 ** 1.406 ***  0.610 *** 0.707 *** 0.488 *** 0.664 *** 
 (3.890)  (3.174)  (2.302)  (3.210)   (5.093)  (7.694)  (3.010)  (5.450)  
NFt -0.019  -0.507 *** -0.089  -0.482 ***  -0.018  -0.128  -0.084  -0.037  
 (-0.185)  (-2.790)  (-0.912)  (-5.207)   (-0.321)  (-0.943)  (-0.805)  (-0.359)  
B/Mt -0.003  -0.085 *** -0.017  -0.124 ***  -0.010 * -0.263 *** -0.013  -0.008  
 (-0.417)  (-3.891)  (-1.576)  (-5.091)   (-1.659)  (-7.709)  (-0.934)  (-1.071)  
Sizet -0.016  0.006  -0.004  -0.111 ***  -0.022  0.017  -0.079  -0.070  
 (-1.228)  (0.285)  (-0.125)  (-2.789)   (-0.883)  (0.773)  (-0.706)  (-1.562)  
Constant 0.345 *** 0.133  0.164  1.330 ***  0.577 *** 0.237  0.681  1.023 *** 
 (3.651)  (0.985)  (1.147)  (3.146)   (2.833)  (1.361)  (1.155)  (2.780)  
Observations 538  343  443  186   737  562  258  561  
Adjusted R2 0.206  0.260  0.232  0.457   0.294  0.459  0.161  0.392  
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Table 5 
Value of cash regressions and culture 
This table shows the results of the value of cash regressions of the matched sample with the excess stock as the dependent variable and firm 
characteristics as independent variables. Xt is the level of a variable at time t. ΔXt is the one-year change in variable X. Cash is cash and 
short-term investments divided by lagged market equity. Shipping is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm operates in the 
shipping industry, and 0 otherwise. Lev is market leverage. E is earnings before extraordinary items plus interest, deferred income taxes and 
investment tax credit divided by lagged market equity. NA is total assets minus cash and short term investments divided by lagged market 
equity. RD is investments in research and development divided by lagged market equity. I is interest expenses divided by lagged market 
equity. D is common dividends paid divided by lagged market equity. NF is net financing, calculated as total equity issuance minus 
repurchases plus debt issuance minus redemption. B/M is book equity divided by market equity. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. 
logarithm of total assets. Based on Hofstede (2001), companies are classified on the country level based on their Individualism or 
Uncertainty Avoidance scores. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity-consistent and clustered at the firm level. t-statistics are shown in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** correspond to statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 Individualism  Uncertainty Avoidance 
 (1) High (2) Low  (3) High (4) Low 
ΔCasht 1.087 *** 1.509 ***  1.629 *** 0.476  
 (2.667)  (4.195)   (4.806)  (0.922)  
ΔCasht × Shipping 0.341  0.864 ***  0.447 * 0.341  
 (1.359)  (2.740)   (1.936)  (0.713)  
Casht-1 × ΔCasht 0.027  -0.697 **  -0.394 * 0.435 ** 
 (0.183)  (-2.296)   (-1.880)  (2.160)  
ΔCasht × Levt -0.655  -1.053 **  -1.035 ** -0.365  
 (-1.188)  (-2.347)   (-2.173)  (-0.775)  
Levt -0.879 *** -0.442 ***  -0.785 *** -0.575 *** 
 (-8.185)  (-3.386)   (-8.696)  (-3.117)  
ΔEt 0.301 ** 0.179 *  0.238 ** 0.235  
 (2.444)  (1.746)   (2.127)  (1.448)  
ΔNAt 0.134 *** 0.211 ***  0.104 *** 0.347 *** 
 (3.041)  (3.649)   (2.874)  (2.906)  
ΔRDt -2.094  0.368   -1.353  0.017  
 (-0.883)  (0.097)   (-0.609)  (0.003)  
ΔIt -0.753  -0.496   -0.802 ** -1.715  
 (-1.343)  (-0.870)   (-2.136)  (-1.548)  
ΔDt 0.972 ** 0.587   0.557  1.462  
 (2.010)  (0.920)   (1.388)  (1.610)  
Casht-1 0.687 *** 0.738 ***  0.675 *** 0.671 *** 
 (6.007)  (7.594)   (6.426)  (4.794)  
NFt 0.020  -0.066   0.031  -0.246 ** 
 (0.281)  (-1.083)   (0.621)  (-2.381)  
B/Mt -0.006  -0.084 **  -0.007  -0.077 *** 
 (-1.427)  (-2.158)   (-1.481)  (-3.101)  
Sizet -0.005  -0.036 *  -0.008  -0.015  
 (-0.395)  (-1.733)   (-0.741)  (-0.570)  
Shipping 0.041  -0.125   0.018  -0.086  
 (0.765)  (-1.622)   (0.390)  (-0.798)  
Constant 0.327 *** 0.440 ***  0.297 *** 0.406 ** 
 (3.307)  (2.990)   (3.635)  (1.978)  
Observations 1,430  583   1,528  485  
Adjusted R2 0.262  0.341   0.303  0.275  
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Table 6 
Value of cash regressions and cyclicality 
This table shows the results of the value of cash regressions of the shipping sample with the excess stock return as the dependent variable 
and firm characteristics as independent variables. Xt is the level of a variable at time t. ΔXt is the one-year change in variable X. Cash is cash 
and short-term investments divided by lagged market equity. Corr is the correlation of a firm’s Tobin’s Q at time t and the ClarkSea index at 
time t-1. Lev is market leverage. E is earnings before extraordinary items plus interest, deferred income taxes and investment tax credit 
divided by lagged market equity. NA is total assets minus cash and short term investments divided by lagged market equity. RD is 
investments in research and development divided by lagged market equity. I is interest expenses divided by lagged market equity. D is 
common dividends paid divided by lagged market equity. NF is net financing, calculated as total equity issuance minus repurchases plus 
debt issuance minus redemption. B/M is book equity divided by market equity. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. The cyclicality of 
growth opportunities is measured as the correlation of a firm‘s growth opportunities with the business cycle (Corr); it is the five-year rolling 
correlation of a firm’s Tobin‘s Q at time t and the ClarkSea index at time t-1. Bad state and good state years are defined as the bottom and 
top 33% of the distribution of the growth of the ClarkSea index, respectively. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity-consistent and clustered 
at the firm level. t-statistics are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** correspond to statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. 
 
(1) 
Full sample 
(2) 
High Corr 
(3) 
Low Corr 
(4) 
Bad state 
(5) 
Good state 
ΔCasht 0.710 *** 0.227  1.295 ** 0.269  0.692 ** 
 (2.750)  (0.846)  (2.031)  (0.540)  (2.238)  
ΔCasht × Corrt -0.630 ***    -0.748 *** -0.200  
 (-3.587)    (-2.835)  (-0.916)  
Corrt 0.044    0.079 ** 0.033  
 (1.353)    (2.108)  (0.727)  
Casht-1 × ΔCasht 0.176 ** 0.038  0.351 ** 0.241 *** 0.189  
 (2.556)  (0.473)  (2.234)  (2.657)  (1.585)  
ΔCasht × Levt 0.321  0.850  -0.436  0.692  0.251  
 (0.762)  (1.588)  (-0.436)  (0.927)  (0.639)  
Levt -0.754 *** -0.997 *** -0.422 ** -0.783 *** -0.762 *** 
 (-5.717)  (-6.689)  (-2.289)  (-5.847)  (-4.069)  
ΔEt 0.072  0.046  0.040  -0.164 ** 0.741 *** 
 (0.530)  (0.390)  (0.261)  (-2.233)  (3.210)  
ΔNAt 0.103  0.027  0.140  0.053  0.268 ** 
 (1.527)  (0.324)  (1.498)  (0.748)  (2.564)  
ΔRDt -135.576 * 8.583  -269.477  -109.215  -300.116  
 (-1.827)  (0.037)  (-1.107)  (-1.105)  (-1.394)  
ΔIt 0.496  0.096  0.440  -0.283  1.611 * 
 (0.645)  (0.081)  (0.527)  (-0.447)  (1.856)  
ΔDt 1.191 * 2.330  0.663  0.272  0.900  
 (1.901)  (1.626)  (0.928)  (0.522)  (0.701)  
Casht-1 0.784 *** 0.764 *** 1.194 *** 0.867 *** 0.833 *** 
 (7.332)  (8.004)  (8.603)  (6.105)  (5.225)  
NFt -0.113  -0.102  0.037  0.007  -0.299  
 (-1.224)  (-1.124)  (0.332)  (0.084)  (-1.631)  
B/Mt -0.011  -0.005  -0.201 *** -0.008  -0.111 *** 
 (-1.428)  (-1.193)  (-3.918)  (-1.522)  (-3.483)  
Sizet 0.016  0.010  0.021  0.006  0.007  
 (0.860)  (0.335)  (0.915)  (0.266)  (0.290)  
Constant 0.102  0.279  -0.052  0.039  0.333 * 
 (0.688)  (1.206)  (-0.297)  (0.216)  (1.686)  
Observations 674  234  212  356  318  
Adjusted R2 0.304  0.327  0.520  0.361  0.364  
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Table 7 
Investment-cash regressions 
This table shows the results of the 3SLS investment cash regressions of the shipping sample, including two models, calculated via 
conditional mixed process. The dependent variables are NetInv (model 1) and Cash (model 2). NetInv is capital expenditures and investment 
in research and development minus depreciation scaled by total assets at time t+1. Cash is cash and short-term investments divided by total 
assets. CF is EBITDA divided by sales. MTB is the ratio of market equity to book equity. PrSalesGr is the natural logarithm of sales growth 
over the previous two years. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Lev is total debt divided by total assets. CFvola is cash flow 
volatility, calculated as the median of the firm-level standard deviation of first differences in earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and 
amortization over the prior 5 years. CCDur is the cash cycle duration at time t, calculated as the sum of average inventory age and average 
collection period less the average payment period. Z is Altman’s (1968) Z-score. RetSpread is the return on investment minus the risk free 
rate. The return on investment is calculated as earnings before interest and taxes divided by total assets. AggSalesGr is the natural logarithm 
of mean sales growth. The cyclicality of growth opportunities is measured as the correlation of a firm‘s growth opportunities with the 
business cycle (Corr); it is the five-year rolling correlation of a firm’s Tobin‘s Q at time t and the ClarkSea index at time t-1. Bad state and 
good state years are defined as the bottom and top 33% of the distribution of the growth (definition 1) or the level (definition 2) of the 
ClarkSea index, respectively. Firm fixed effects are included. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity-consistent and clustered at the firm 
level. t-statistics are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** correspond to statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
(1) 
Full sample 
 
(2)  
High Corr 
 
(3)  
Low Corr 
 
(4)  
Bad state 
(definition 1) 
(5) 
Bad state 
(definition 2) 
(6)  
Bad state & 
high Corr 
(7)  
Bad state & 
low Corr 
Panel A: NetInv regression 
Casht 0.215 *** 0.236  0.428 *** 0.099  0.230 ** 0.159  0.430 *** 
 (3.005)  (1.038)  (2.802)  (1.441)  (2.030)  (1.231)  (2.943)  
CFt 0.039 *** 0.086  0.016  0.027  0.047  -0.011  -0.028  
 (2.953)  (1.505)  (0.319)  (1.227)  (1.367)  (-0.248)  (-0.591)  
MTBt 0.002 *** 0.037 *** 0.001  0.014 *** 0.006  0.041 *** 0.003  
 (7.387)  (3.010)  (0.103)  (2.802)  (0.756)  (3.914)  (0.207)  
PrSalesGrt 0.011 *** 0.014 * 0.000  0.011 *** 0.009  0.022 *** 0.007  
 (3.534)  (1.750)  (0.012)  (3.339)  (1.492)  (2.947)  (1.009)  
Panel B: Cash regression               
CFt -0.034  0.081  -0.091 * -0.042  -0.014  0.113 * -0.069  
 (-1.356)  (1.480)  (-1.818)  (-1.307)  (-0.459)  (1.785)  (-0.993)  
MTBt 0.002  0.031 ** 0.006  0.003  0.002  -0.014  0.000  
 (1.633)  (2.295)  (1.032)  (0.618)  (1.111)  (-1.103)  (0.049)  
Sizet -0.005  -0.017 ** -0.001  -0.003  -0.001  0.002  -0.003  
 (-1.071)  (-2.316)  (-0.145)  (-0.614)  (-0.139)  (0.256)  (-0.243)  
Levt -0.162 *** -0.150 *** -0.130 ** -0.096 ** -0.060  0.053  -0.156 * 
 (-4.189)  (-2.653)  (-2.235)  (-2.122)  (-1.337)  (0.861)  (-1.847)  
CFVolat 0.497  0.866  0.843  0.778  1.261 ** 2.025 *** -0.423  
 (1.026)  (0.968)  (0.991)  (1.164)  (2.140)  (2.608)  (-0.356)  
CCDurt -0.000  0.000  -0.000 ** 0.000  -0.000 *** 0.000  -0.000  
 (-0.999)  (0.069)  (-2.201)  (0.094)  (-2.736)  (0.074)  (-1.492)  
Zt 0.003  0.000  0.003  0.011  0.017 * 0.046 *** 0.001  
 (1.085)  (0.172)  (0.427)  (1.549)  (1.817)  (4.518)  (0.131)  
RetSpreadt -0.001  -0.464 * 0.148  0.049  -0.474 *** -0.563 ** 0.137  
 (-0.014)  (-1.855)  (0.668)  (0.380)  (-2.639)  (-2.134)  (0.532)  
AggSalesGrt 0.005 ** 0.013 *** -0.002  0.006  -0.001  0.015 ** -0.007  
 (2.011)  (2.782)  (-0.392)  (1.615)  (-0.366)  (2.569)  (-0.849)  
Observations 1,294  267  218  622  345  138  124  
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Table 8 
Robustness test: Investment-cash regression and crisis 
This table shows the results of the difference-in-differences regressions of the matched sample for the years 2004 to 2010. Xt is the level of a 
variable at time t. ΔXt is the one-year change in variable X. The independent variable, NetInvi,t+1, is calculated as capital expenditures minus 
depreciation plus R&D expenses scaled by total assets at time t+1. Crisis is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if t is between 2008 
and 2010, and 0 otherwise. Shipping is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm operates in the shipping industry, and 0 
otherwise. Cash is cash and short-term investments divided by total assets Q is Tobin’s Q. OCF is EBITDA scaled by total assets. Standard 
errors are heteroscedasticity-consistent and clustered at the firm level. t-statistics are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** correspond to 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Crisist -0.036 *** -0.016 * -0.012 -0.016 * -0.003 
 (-6.499) (-1.785) (-1.343) (-1.669) (-0.234) 
Crisist × Shipping   -0.038 *** -0.027 ** -0.031 *** -0.055 *** 
   (-3.304) (-2.422) (-2.648) (-3.395) 
Shipping   0.077 *** 0.059 *** 0.061 *** 0.078 *** 
   (7.399) (5.564) (5.866) (6.159) 
Casht    0.163 *** 0.135 *** 0.261 *** 
    (5.247) (3.643) (3.845) 
Casht × Crisist      0.059 -0.127 
      (1.158) (-1.240) 
Casht × Crisist × Shipping        0.251 ** 
        (2.124) 
Casht × Shipping        -0.181 ** 
        (-2.252) 
Qt    0.025 *** 0.025 *** 0.023 *** 
    (4.129) (4.212) (3.891) 
OCFt    0.052 0.051 0.057 
    (1.385) (1.372) (1.555) 
Constant 0.078 *** 0.035 *** -0.013 -0.012 -0.019 * 
 (14.218) (4.613) (-1.202) (-1.092) (-1.715) 
Observations 1,125  1,125  1,122  1,122  1,122  
Adjusted R2 0.014  0.104  0.144  0.144  0.148  
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Table 9 
Robustness test: Value of cash, cyclicality, and investment 
This table shows the results of the value of cash regressions of the shipping sample with the excess stock return as the dependent variable 
and firm characteristics as independent variables. Xt is the level of a variable at time t. ΔXt is the one-year change in variable X. Cash is cash 
and short-term investments divided by lagged market equity. Corr is the correlation of a firm’s Tobin’s Q at time t and the ClarkSea index at 
time t-1. Lev is market leverage. E is earnings before extraordinary items plus interest, deferred income taxes and investment tax credit 
divided by lagged market equity. NA is total assets minus cash and short term investments divided by lagged market equity. RD is 
investments in research and development divided by lagged market equity. I is interest expenses divided by lagged market equity. D is 
common dividends paid divided by lagged market equity. NF is net financing, calculated as total equity issuance minus repurchases plus 
debt issuance minus redemption. B/M is book equity divided by market equity. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. The cyclicality of 
growth opportunities is measured as the correlation of a firm‘s growth opportunities with the business cycle (Corr); it is the five-year rolling 
correlation of a firm’s Tobin‘s Q at time t and the ClarkSea index at time t-1. A firm is classified as high investment when its NetInv is 
within the top 33% of the distribution. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity-consistent and clustered at the firm level. t-statistics are shown 
in parentheses. *, **, and *** correspond to statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 (1) 
Full sample 
(2) 
Full sample 
(3) 
High Corr 
(4) 
High Corr & 
high investment 
(5) 
Low Corr 
(6) 
Low Corr & 
high investment 
ΔCasht 0.836 *** 1.089 *** 0.688 *** 1.000 *** 1.447 *** 2.603 *** 
 (5.133)  (9.093)  (4.524)  (3.280)  (8.098)  (6.704)  
ΔCasht × Corrt    -0.595 ***      
    (-3.693)      
Corrt    0.041      
    (1.200)      
Levt -1.157 *** -0.712 *** -0.962 *** -0.486  -0.397 ** -0.390  
 (-8.177)  (-5.718)  (-5.983)  (-1.502)  (-2.165)  (-1.022)  
ΔEt 0.207  0.037  0.033  0.659 * -0.011  -0.894 * 
 (1.638)  (0.290)  (0.275)  (1.717)  (-0.075)  (-1.703)  
ΔNAt 0.094 * 0.097  0.045  0.274  0.136  0.896 *** 
 (1.768)  (1.330)  (0.491)  (1.204)  (1.422)  (4.456)  
ΔRDt -108.929  -330.072 *** -2.680  5612.284  -690.727 *** 2822.830  
 (-1.240)  (-3.609)  (-0.011)  (1.320)  (-5.489)  (0.599)  
ΔIt -0.574  0.539  0.232  3.249  0.431  8.828 *** 
 (-1.114)  (0.638)  (0.174)  (1.042)  (0.491)  (3.031)  
ΔDt 1.074 ** 1.225 ** 1.712  -1.277  0.775  6.368 ** 
 (2.553)  (1.966)  (1.307)  (-0.426)  (1.082)  (2.144)  
Casht-1 0.631 *** 0.700 *** 0.626 *** 0.652 *** 1.129 *** 0.353  
 (3.689)  (7.611)  (7.426)  (2.848)  (8.876)  (1.475)  
NFt 0.036  -0.116  -0.113  -0.389 ** 0.050  -0.538  
 (0.542)  (-1.152)  (-1.175)  (-2.373)  (0.431)  (-1.457)  
B/Mt -0.011  -0.012  -0.008  -0.270 *** -0.196 *** -0.242 *** 
 (-1.532)  (-1.412)  (-1.226)  (-2.879)  (-3.608)  (-3.011)  
Sizet -0.028  0.016  0.009  0.024  0.016  0.004  
 (-1.176)  (0.945)  (0.276)  (0.516)  (0.751)  (0.069)  
Constant 0.682 *** 0.102  0.320  0.250  -0.021  0.182  
 (3.329)  (0.737)  (1.439)  (0.659)  (-0.122)  (0.449)  
Observations 1,360  674  234  59  212  47  
Adjusted R2 0.244  0.295  0.300  0.368  0.516  0.740  
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Figure 1. Cash holdings by year 
This figure shows annual means of cash holdings (cash/total assets) for the matched sample divided into 
shipping firms (Matched shipping) and their matches (Matched manufacturing) as well as all manufacturing 
firms from Compustat Global (All manufacturing). Cash holdings are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. 
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Figure 2. Cash holdings by year for constrained and unconstrained firms 
This figure shows annual means of cash holdings (cash/total assets) for the matched sample divided into 
shipping firms (Shipping) and their matches (Manufacturing) as well as into financially constrained and 
unconstrained firms according to their firm size. Cash holdings are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. 
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